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Abstract 
 
The aim of this article is to sketch the procedural nature of the modus in 
which Deleuze reads the other philosophers. The hermeneutical problem 
indicated by the indecision to consider his books on different authors as an 
authorized interpretation or as fantasist utilization may be scattered if we 
understand his hermeneutical attempts both as interpretation and 
construction (concept or problem). In addition, this indecision affects the guild 
of Deleuzian exegetes in respect to the directory idea (prime author) which 
could point out the general strategy of his philosophy. 
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I believe it is relevant to describe Deleuze’s ‘interpretive 
method’ in a plural manifestation form because its denomination 
in singular ought to include a complex web of positions regarding 
the problems arising from the preparation, conduct and waging of 
a ‘guerilla war’ within and with philosophy. This is the reason why 
I have selected Hume, Nietzsche, Kant and Bergson from his 
works (written in his early period), the elements that enable the 
realization of a sketch of his ‘method’. 
How can one explain Gilles Deleuze’s philosophical 
initiative? How can it be explained taking into account the 
polymorphous nature resulting from its ambiguous relation with 
the ‘academia’? Will we find an answer in case we discover what 
his philosophy aims to overcome, accomplish, oppose, or, to put it 
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more simply, in case we discover who or what does he write 
against? 
If we analyze procedurally the implications of Deleuze’s 
philosophy, we can state in principle that: a) his philosophy is not 
an unknown fruit (as one could think taking into account the 
famous exotic titles, especially in the English speaking regions, 
that announce an exegesis on Deleuze) that emerged accidentally 
from the old tree of Western philosophy and that b) his genuine 
concepts are also pro/ble/gram/matic reactions to the above 
mentioned tradition. 
Vincent Descombes, one of the authors who attempted to 
outline the complex situation of the ‘60s atmosphere in France, 
exemplifies the subjectivity as main thread. It is a main thread to 
the extent that subjectivity faced a dual attack: a) against the 
idealist premises of phenomenology in search of a ‘genuine’ cogito, 
thus maintaining the subject as a principle, and b) against 
dialectics seen as pivoting around ‘a higher concept of identity’ 
(Descombes 1980, 76). We may relate Deleuze to these combatant 
attitudes if we widen the meaning presupposed by subjectivity 
and the horizon of its justifiability, if we take into account the 
‘flank’ it opens up in relation to: “(…) the critique or 
deconstruction of interiority, of self-presence, of consciousness, of 
mastery, of the individual or collective property of an essence. 
Critique or deconstruction of the firmness of a seat (hypokeimenon, 
substantia, subjectum) and the certitude of an authority and a 
value (the individual, a people, the state, history, work).” (Nancy 
1991, 4) 
However, from this perspective only, we observe a purely 
reactive reactionary presence in Deleuzes’s case. Does his 
philosophy coagulates only and to the extent that it is a choleric 
reaction to the classical themes of philosophy, just like the light of 
a bulb only draws out and gathers the insects wandering in the 
dark? It is not by chance (but not undisputable) that the exegesis 
in the field suggests as direction vectors of Deleuze’s philosophy 
authors that he approached. In this sense, Bergson, Nietzsche and 
Spinoza are linked in various ways in order to explain the 
Deleuzian project. Here are some examples taken from the 
literature in the field to support this argument. 
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For instance, Badiou believes that Bergson is the true 
inspiration of Deleuze’s thinking (the idealism of his philosophy) 
(Badiou 1999, 39); in the same spirit, Keith Ansell Pearson 
believes that Deleuze’s ontology owes everything to Bergson and 
that the reading of Spinoza bears a Bergsonian influence (Pearson 
1999, 12). According to Constantin V. Boundas, the 
transcendental empiricism of Deleuze is Bergson-inspired 
(Boundas 2006, 11). Michael Hardt divided Deleuze’s philosophy 
into a Bergson-inspired ontology, an ethics supported by 
Nietzsche’s philosophy and a ‘politics’ supported by a collective 
model of Spinoza-inspired ethical practice. According to Hardt, the 
Deleuzian reading of Spinoza has Bergsonian and Nietzschean 
characteristics, and the successive reading of these authors 
ensured Deleuze with the anti-Hegelian project of his philosophy 
(Hardt 1993, X–XII). Todd May states that there is a ‘holy Trinity’ 
of Deleuze’s philosophy where: Spinoza is the Son, Bergson is the 
Father and Nietzsche is the Holy Spirit. In the same line, at the 
‘individual all-round’ section, Spinoza and Bergson make up 
Deleuze’s ontology with the immanence and duration concepts. 
Also, Nietzsche holds the affirmative flag of a subversive ethics 
(May 2005, 25–27). In contrast (as an exotic contrasting example), 
Manuel Delanda relates his philosophy to the scientific discourse 
because he takes Deleuze as a procesualist thinker (Delanda 2002, 
14–16). 
We might think that the reason why the authors wooed by 
Deleuze are suggested as directions of his thinking consists in the 
fact that each of them is a counterpoint to the mainstream 
philosophy: Spinoza to the rationalists and theology; Nietzsche to 
the philosophy at large, it seems, seen as Platonic metaphysics; 
Bergson to Kant, Hegel or, generally speaking, to the way 
philosophical problems are constructed. In the scenarios described 
by the above mentioned writers, Deleuze appears to suggest 
himself as a spearhead for an already existing aggressive 
direction. However, it is imperative that we do not forget that 
Deleuze’s way of reading singles out an author and somehow 
takes him outside an official tradition. Can it be stated that 
Deleuze has ‘built’ himself a tradition or is it possible that the 
selection of authors, the electivity lying at the basis of their exotic 
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cohabitation within a ‘tradition’ is proof of a taste for ‘scandal’ in 
philosophy? 
I suggest that we discover the method of the Deleuzian 
reading by following the course of his first books and especially his 
very first book on Hume’s philosophy, which is unjustly absent 
from the exegesis on the matter. 
(a) Although it is not the main object of his first work, 
Deleuze puts into question the way one can tell which manner of 
reading is better than another. In Deleuze’s view, to position 
oneself to a text is to detect the problem that makes up the 
foundation and the structure of a theory, that is to understand 
and question not the solution to a problem but the very 
interrogation that rephrases a certain type of experience, 
presupposing other connections, other differentiation relations, a 
new way of forcing things out, etc. (a surprisingly recurring theme 
forty years later in What is philosophy?). Therefore, to criticize is 
to detect a ‘force deficit’, a too mainstream way of thematizing the 
basic data of an experience, the insufficiency of a differentiation, 
the commonplaceness of a comment in relation to the experience 
of a problem through an author.  “To put something in question 
means subordinating and subjecting things to the question, 
intending, through this constrained and forced subsumption, that 
they reveal an essence or a nature. To criticize the question means 
showing under what conditions the question is possible and 
correctly raised; in other words, how things would not be what 
they are were the question different from the one formulated.” 
(Deleuze 1991, 106) 
This is the reason why the Deleuzian transcription of the 
problematics of Hume’s empiricism starts with the interrogation 
of the nature of subjectivity: is it not that the subject constitutes 
itself within the given? And the condition of possibility, the 
playground of this interrogation is given by the phrase ‘relations 
are external to ideas’ (Deleuze 1991, 24, 119). The Deleuzian 
empiricism takes on a type of reading that engages the history of 
philosophy through the problematics that break up the continuous 
aspect of its history; this reading frames an author with a 
constant view to the position of a precise problem – such as that of 
the subject – and to the presentation of the conditions of this 
problem. Thus, it is understood that to Deleuze the fidelity of a 
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reading per se limits itself to the maintaining of the problematic 
field, where the problematic field is the univocal relation described 
(rhizomatically) as the coupling of the problem to its emergence 
conditions. Therefore, the relation between Hume, his work and 
Deleuze’s position towards it focus on the same fact when the 
consistency of the reading is in view and not so much its justness. 
The psychological or social factors can be conceived of as color 
enhancers of the problematics, that is they express the set of 
motivations and do not induce the degree of truth nor the degree 
of falseness of the question. ‘Hume’ is simply the nominal owner of 
a problematic field. In a pragmatist way similar to a certain point 
with Richard Rorty, Deleuze can tell us that the importance of an 
author disappears or holds depending on the problematics that 
can recreate him (Alliez 2004, 33). 
However, the generally defining aspect of the Deleuzian 
reading strategy is the fact that to interpret is to simultaneously 
construct, and the two generate the true unity of a creation if, of 
course, the creation makes current a certain problematics. “(…) to 
see the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to 
the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an 
author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own 
offspring, yet monstrous. It was really important for it to be his 
own child, because the author had to actually say all I had him 
saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it 
resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and 
hidden emissions that I really enjoyed.” (Deleuze 1995, 6) 
In other words, the Deleuzian reading way must be 
simultaneously understood as interpretation and construction of 
concept – a procreating ‘sodomizing’ as Deleuze himself calls it. A 
procedural division of this hermeneutic couple distinguishes on 
the one hand, in the case of the work on Hume, constructivism1 as 
an immanent manner of restitution of the conceptual stake of an 
author, emphasizing the play of the structural elements, and on 
the other hand, an assembly and deconstruction strategy 
regarding mainly authors and their ‘isms’, concepts, distinctions 
pertaining to the official history of philosophy and that may be 
included generically under the label interpretation. Interpretation 
plays a minimal role in the assembly of the contrast elements (for 
instance, Hume – Bergson, Nietzsche – Freud), but a decisive one 
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when the problematics in question has a certain shape and 
conflicting determination in connection to a tradition or an event-
author (Kant in this case). To be more precise, in the book in 
question, Deleuze inaugurates the relation Hume – Kant on the 
subject issue. This relation does not presuppose the reiteration of 
the historical sequence Hume – Kant in order to discover the 
difficulties that the former could not overcome in connection with 
the latter, nor to evaluate the epistemological solfeggio sung by 
Kant in order to dissipate the atonal skepticism of Hume. In the 
case of the problematics assumed by Deleuze, the reiteration of 
this sequence is decisive for the way in which, starting from 
Hume’s philosophy, a theory of subjectivity can be grounded in its 
practical origins, as well as, of course, its conflicting relation with 
the Kantian transcendental theory. 
Formally, the two movements that describe the physics of 
the Deleusian problematic moves in the case of Hume’s philosophy 
can be extended by suggesting generically and unitarily a new 
way of working in philosophy, and particularly in the case of each 
book (Nietzsche, Bergson, Kant, Proust, Sacher-Masoch): a) an 
immanent reading that goes through and connects the basic data 
of a certain problematics; b) a critical, sometimes de/re-
constructive review or infusion of certain concepts, distinctions, 
major philosophical theses. 
(b) Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche’s philosophy is multiply 
relevant. Its importance can be biographically determined2; it is 
also decisively relevant to the first hand exegesis on Nietzsche. 
And not least, at the conceptual level, disregarding the other two 
relevant points, there is a problematics determined by the 
certification of a ‘radical empiricism’ and a ‘nihilist dialectics’. We 
can configure and procedurally separate the construction and 
interpretation elements in order to detect the relation Deleuze – 
Nietzsche in his aggressive trial against philosophy the same way 
we described Deleuze’s reading on Hume. “The philosophical 
learning of an author is not assessed by numbers of quotations, 
nor by the always fanciful and conjectural check lists of libraries, 
but by the apologetic or polemical directions of his work itself. We 
will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche's work if we do not see 
"against whom" its principle concepts are directed. Hegelian 
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themes are present in this work as the enemy against which it 
fights.” (Deleuze 2002, 162) 
Let us imagine Deleuze’s book like a battlefield within 
philosophy; his strategy must be deduced from the concrete 
movement of concepts, in connection with the enemy he encircles 
or carefully studies. The movements per se of a concept depending 
on its operative enemy, the encirclement, the jumble, the constant 
fight are the signs of what we called constructivism. The strategy 
of scrapping, assembly, local coherence and interdependence 
inferred from these movements bears the generic title of 
interpretation.3 
(c) Deleuze’s work on Kant is a source of perplexity for the 
readers accustomed to his ‘hallucinative’ reading method. There is 
no ‘problematic staging’, no confronted positions, and no 
discussion about a possible lack: one is simply confronting some 
subtle notes depicting the cobweb of Kantian critical philosophy, 
put down with the thoroughness of an inquirer. In this sense, one 
of Deleuze’s commentators has a synthetic view on the 
hermeneutical scenarios displayed by Deleuze in his books, 
drawing them closer to the detective novel build-up manner: 
“Philosophy is a detective story to the extent that we start not 
from the knowledge or assumptions, but from the clues, disparate 
elements, combined later in a virtual world whose only 
consistency is the internal consistency of a possible model.” 
(Antonioli 1999, 15) 
In comparison to the method I suggest, consisting in the 
definition of the Deleuzian reading strategy simultaneously as 
concept interpretation and construction, the narrative premise 
risks engaging and wasting the Deleuzian philosophy between the 
folds of an excessive and dominant pragmatist hermeneutics. The 
investigation of the inquirer assembles the clues in a montage 
and, secondly, in a coherent virtual scenario through the network 
of signs intersection and sending. The fact that the montage does 
not represent the ‘in-self’ of an author does not reduce the 
Deleuzian procedure to a merely narrative method. Moreover, the 
montage procedure is energized by a collage method4 that settles 
in conceptual constructions the clues of a level, placing it into the 
multiple and transversal network of the other levels that make up 
the work of an author; this takes place in various opposition or 
Emilian Mărgărit / A Sketch of Deleuze’s Hermeneutical Spin 
457 
 
 
alliance scenarios, within an unconventional or elective history of 
philosophy (Hume deconstructs the transcendental unity of the 
subject, Nietzsche completes the Kantian critique, Hume’s link to 
Nietzsche concerning the exteriority of relations, the manner in 
which something can be thought, etc.). What is more, the authors 
who have a stand at the level of the various problematic 
representations are distributed differently5 (the Hume in his first 
book is different from the Hume in Difference and Repetition), in 
main or secondary roles (Bergson in Difference and Repetition in 
relation to Logic of Sense), a neuter tone (the book on Kant) or a 
negative tone (Kant as an example of the dogmatic image of 
thinking). This is why, for Deleuze, the plan and the problematics 
of every authors, the produced oppositions or alliances are unique. 
The Deleuzian investigation may suppose both an interpretation 
and construction procedure and a neuter action of ‘parceling out’ 
and deconstruction, as can be seen in his reading of Kant.6  
(d) The situation is completely different in his work on 
Bergson’s philosophy. Perhaps that is the reason behind the title 
of this work – Bergsonism. “The notion of difference promises to 
throw light on the philosophy of Bergson, and inversely, 
Bergsonism promises to make an inestimable contribution to a 
philosophy of difference.” (Deleuze 2004, 32) The strategy of this 
work can be, in turn, traced back to the Deleuzian interpretation 
and construction method, only that, in this case, Deleuze focuses 
on the problematic lines emerging from what is to become a 
Bergsonian ‘tradition’. Concepts as ‘multiplicity’, ‘virtuality’ are to 
be thrown upon the swarming relentless world and recovered as  
evanescent nets of experience (that condition no more than that 
are conditioning in contrast with the a priori schemes) making 
visible par example the concrete cadence of time as the books on 
Cinema have showed. This is the sense in which, and as a 
consequence of which I can understand the Bergsonian ubiquity in 
the explanatory positions of many Deleuzian themes. 
In conclusion the hermeneutical spin proper to Deleuze’s 
own way of making philosophy is not based on a vulgar or savage 
utilization of texts, concepts, distinction aiming to reach by all 
means a postmodern relativistic view on whatever is looking at. 
On the contrary we are dealing with a very ‘serious’ (as Foucault 
has labeled him) undertake in philosophy constructi
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philosophy with the reach material of tradition the virtual 
structure of what it is that make as to do what we do ‘now’.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 This term is coined as a terminal overview in the first section of What is 
Philosophy? on the manner in which philosophy makes shifts in the problematic 
jumps taken from an author to another (subject of Descartes and the subject of 
Spinoza or Kant for example). Furthermore if What is philosophy? is leveraged by 
a personal investigation of Deleuze regarding his one way of  making philosophy, 
then the sketch of the hermeneutical spin we are trying to draw could be justified 
by the mega-theme of philosophy as such put in to act in this final book. Guattari 
is not excluded although the book mention is co-written, just an-present in respect 
to the lines that are ‘fished’ from the creative pool of Deleuze first period that 
stretches from the book on Hume till the Logic of sense.     
2 “It was Nietzsche, who I read only later, who extricated me from all this. 
Because you just can't deal with him in the same sort of way. He gets up to all 
sorts of things behind your back.” (Deleuze 1995, 6) This phrase of Deleuze bears 
special awakeners because it is hard to understand why Nietzsche is put in the 
‘later’ list of authors ‘dwelt’ with since his book on Nietzsche is his second official 
book. We can understand this sentence if we presume that he wrote the other 
books (or some of them, Bergsonism for example) before that of Nietzsche and the 
order of publishing is just unimportant irrelevant or that is affirming the 
difficulties encompassed by his ‘strategy’ (that we are trying to sketch) and that 
the resistance of Nietzsche has made his ‘capture apparatus’ a more sophisticated, 
evolved philosophical parasite in the body of philosophy.       
3 In the book dedicated to Nietzsche’s philosophy we pursue the structural sphere 
of constructivism in respect to the concepts of force, will to power and the element 
that is correlated with them – quality. The non-philosophical embodiments 
present in those concepts (biology, thermo-dynamics) due to Nietzsche one 
strategy is re-dimensioned by Deleuze in the struggle against Hegelianism. 
Deleuze is shadowing Nietzsche’s philosophy in the light of Salomon Maimon’s 
project that is mainly constructed in regard to Kant’s transcendental philosophy, 
thus we have a Nietzsche that passes (in the figural and literal sense) over Hegel 
to restate the stakes of post-Kantianism’s and in an opening way to solve them. 
The sphere of interpretation is basically that with which Deleuze is in the first 
sits of Nietzsche exegesis, a systematic approach of Nietzsche’s philosophy (a 
coherent explication of the relation between force and will to power with all its 
implications).      
4 We must not forget that Deleuze is assembling various facts from let’s simply 
say non-philosophical domains as literature, art, biology etc.  as support for a 
philosophical thesis (the virtual for example).  
5 Zourabichvili speaks of an “unconventional usage of indirect speech” in 
Deleuze’s book on other authors (Zourabichvili 2004, 14). I would say that Deleuze 
relates only to what can his procedure retain and not "the story" itself of an 
author; electivity holds similar to the manner we chose our friends, basically 
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regarding personal traits and pure resonance. “Whether they're real or imaginary, 
animate or inanimate, you have to form your mediators. It's a series. If you're not 
in some series, even a completely imaginary one, you're lost. I need my mediators 
to express myself, and they'd never express themselves without me: you're always 
working in a group, even when you seem to be on your own.” (Deleuze 1995, 125) 
The cause of this rhetorical ‘echoes’ through others is based first of all on a 
common cause (critique of transcendence, or ego for example) and in relation to 
our sketch by the very own procedure of Deleuze ‘method’ of philosophizing.     
6 “My book on Kant's different; I like it, I did it as a book about an enemy that 
tries to show how his system works, its various cogs - the tribunal of Reason, the 
legitimate exercise of the faculties (our subjection to these made all the more 
hypocritical by our being characterized as legislators).” (Deleuze 1995, 6) Perhaps 
this is why in What is Philosophy? Deleuze will present a graphic sketch of how 
the subject circumscribed to the rigors of Kantian works. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 56). 
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